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THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPMENT FUNDS  
AT COMPANIES RECEIVING STATE-AID GRANTS 1
György Vas
In order to make use of non-repayable state grants, firms need to possess internal 
funds, which we can refer to as internal funds for development. The value of these 
is equal to the funds accumulated over previous years; that is, the relatively broad-
ly defined accumulated profit. The benefit of development projects implemented 
with grants is that they increase social value added; but without the appropriate 
incentives, firms have a tendency to simply boost their individual profitability. 
We can identify this as a moral hazard of the grants. This study examines how the 
extent of this moral hazard can be deduced based on quality parameters, and it 
explores the relationship between the size of a development project, the available 
internal funds and the paid-out grants. It analyses in detail the consequences of 
overfunding and underfunding, which can be identified in terms of their impacts 
on the social value added.
JEL codes: O11, O12
Keywords: moral hazard, development policy, financing
1 INTRODUCTION
The continuous development of companies’ operations could be one of the most 
substantial sources of growth in revenue and profitability; and non-repayable 
government grants are available for this. One prerequisite for making use of the 
grants is that the applicant must possess sufficient internal funds. Development 
funds are one of the most important elements of the firms’ operation, as they fa-
cilitate the implementation of future development projects and ensure the growth 
of firms. Internal Funds for Development (IFD) are liquid assets deriving from 
the firms’ profitable operation, and from depreciation not spent on investment or 
replacement, the value of which is significantly influenced by the financial settle-
ment of EU non-repayable grants.
1 The author is a researcher at the Small Business Development Centre of Corvinus University, 
Budapest.
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Unlike funds obtained from financial institutions, state grants, which are intend-
ed to boost competitiveness and employment while stimulating investment and 
innovation, do not have to be repaid provided that the purpose of the aid has been 
achieved. Banerjee–Duflo (2004) and Miller–Rojas (2004) refer to funds obtained 
from financial institutions as one of the most significant factors in the growth of 
an enterprise, and in this regard Beck (2007) draw attention to the limited nature 
of funds accessible to SMEs. It is precisely with a view to softening credit con-
straints that assisted lending programmes (Griffith-Jones et al., 2011) and non-
repayable grants (EC, 2015) are used. These methods of state aid are similar in 
that they both make procuring factors of production cheaper, and in this way 
exert their economic-stimulus effect. The companies, therefore, do not repay the 
money in cash, but instead generate social value added by achieving economic 
development objectives. It is important to examine this process in more depth, 
because owing to the moral hazard we can observe that, in the absence of ap-
propriate incentives, companies may give preference to maximising their own 
profitability rather than increasing the social value added.
Non-repayable state aid grants create an additional opportunity to obtain funds 
for the implementation of developments, in excess of what can be achieved with 
internal funds, and to improve competitiveness through a reduction in the acqui-
sition cost of production tools. The operating mechanism of financing by com-
mercial banks is as follows: The financial intermediation system offers financial 
resources and requests collateral to secure them, the company repays the prin-
cipal and pays the interest on it. During the provision of direct state aid grants, 
firms also receive funds for a defined purpose, but do not pay interest on it; and if 
the development objective is fulfilled, it does not even have to be paid back. In this 
event, the state receives social value added in return for the financial aid. In the 
case of bank financing, the moral hazard is that of a company taking out a loan 
in the knowledge that it will be unable to repay it. When it comes to state aid, the 
received funds do not have to be repaid, so the definition of the moral hazard also 
changes accordingly. In the case of state aid, the basic scenario of the moral haz-
ard is where the entrepreneur knows that he or she will not generate social value 
added, but nevertheless uses or applies for the non-repayable grant.
If state grants are paid out, firms can achieve higher accumulation of equity be-
cause the paid-out amounts of aid are stated as profit-increasing items during the 
amortisation period. The firms’ liquid assets, similarly to projects implemented 
with non-repayable grants, increase by the value of the given year’s profit and 
depreciation during the maintenance period; but firms that have received grants 
can recognise the part of the previously paid aid apportioned to the given year as 
a profit-increasing item. This means that the profit and retained earnings of the 
subsidised firms, and through this their equity, grows by more. It is through this 
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mechanism that state aid grants lead accelerated capital accumulation at firms 
receiving state aid.
It is in the state’s interest to support projects that benefit society, because this is 
how firms repay the funds transferred to them. It is no simple task to select the 
cases in which the social value added matches the given economic-policy objec-
tive. Owing to the asymmetric distribution of information, the businessperson 
knows about several quality parameters relating to his or her own project that he 
or she does not share, or only partially shares, with the bank. This is a passive be-
haviour pattern, resulting in a choice: the entrepreneur plans to use a service that 
will increase his individual profitability, but for the lender it might result in a loss.
Means of reducing moral hazard could be obtaining supplementary information 
or requesting a certain amount of internal funds. This makes it possible to achieve 
a situation in which projects that really do have better quality parameters, and 
thus a better chance of success, receive financing or state aid. This is why I am 
examining more closely the Internal Funds for Development, by which I mean 
the amount of available liquid assets previously generated by the firms, which can 
be used for implementing further development projects.
2 MORAL HAZARD OF STATE AID 
No empirical studies can be found that discuss moral hazard of EU state aid 
grants. This may be because it is difficult to analyse an incentive-related problem 
based on macroeconomic data. For this, we need to set up an analytical frame-
work that specifically examines moral hazard in relation to state grants. No such 
theoretical model is available, however, and several reasons for this can be identi-
fied. Firstly, we can define several forms of state intervention, including but not 
limited to the bail-out of a corporation or sector, the provision of interest-free 
funds of development banks, or the granting of direct non-repayable aid. In do-
mestic practice, the intermediation system created for the transfer of EU funds 
to SMEs has a high weight within the system of development policy tools. This is 
also underpinned by the fact that strengthening the SME sector is a key economic 
development objective, which in the 2007–2013 period received HUF 811.5 billion 
paid out under the Economic Development Operative Programme (GOP), to be 
followed in the 2014-2020 cycle – according to plans – by some HUF 2,733 billion 
in direct aid under the Economic Development and Innovation Operative Pro-
gramme (GINOP).2 
2 http://gazdasagfejlesztes.gov.hu/sites/default/files/gazdagsagfejlesztes_2015_kiadvany.pdf
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International literature is divided in its views of state intervention. Tirole (2009), 
following on from Holmstorm–Tirole (1997), continues to see the state’s role in 
corporate lending as being limited to bail-out. The analytical background of 
the Holmstrom–Tirole model could serve as an excellent basis for analysing the 
mechanism of effect of direct state grants; but it must be stressed that it views 
the state’s role as something completely different. It distinguishes between fiscal 
and monetary bail-out, which it defines in different ways. This is the only form 
in which the model defines state aid; that is, as a type of state intervention, and 
it does not regard the state aid examined in my research as an economic stimu-
lus tool. In the Hungarian literature, the correlation between moral hazards and 
grants is investigated by Berlinger et al. (2015; 2016). In his detailed analysis of 
the economic stimulus measures of the 2008 economic crisis, Vives (2010) also 
regards the money pumped into the financial intermediation sector as state aid. 
The author gives an excellent overview of the complete rearrangement of the Eu-
ropean banking market, in which the financial institutions restructured, or sold 
and reorganised their operations with the aim of reducing their moral hazard.
State intervention was interpreted as taking the form of regulation, which can 
be defined as a trade-off between competition and stability. Berger–Udell (2006) 
proposes a general framework for the examination of access to credit by SMEs. 
They highlight that access to external finance by SMEs is both an important the-
oretical economic issue and a key problem for policy-makers. Kállay (2014) ex-
amines the spill-over effect of state grants provided to SMEs, which he pinpoints 
as an improvement in income-generating capacity and competitiveness. He pro-
poses that, in addition to the abundance of funds, the economic and regulatory 
environment in which the SMEs eventually receive the grants also needs to be 
examined. A hard-to-predict economic environment, and competing aid pro-
grammes, give rise to problems like crowding out. It’s important to find the par-
allels between state grants and bank financing; and use them as a lens through 
which to read research papers which, at first glance, appear to examine entirely 
different issues. Kállay’s study contains an implicit examination of the frame-
work, relating to the mechanism of effect of state grants, which Berger–Udell 
(2006) describes explicitly in relation to SME lending problems. They describe 
in detail how the access of SMEs to credit is influenced by the structure of the 
banking system and by government interventions, through their impact on the 
lending methodology. 
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3 THE USE OF INTERNAL FUNDS IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
In what follows, we examine the availability of internal funds in the development 
projects in relation to the grants awarded to the SME sector during the 2007–2013 
EU planning cycle. Prior to making use of the grants, the firm concerned had 
differing extents of internal funds. Certain firms would have been capable of im-
plementing the entire development project without any external help whatsoever. 
The question is whether it could be regarded as desirable from an economic de-
velopment perspective to support firms which would anyway be capable of imple-
menting the development project without the grant. 
The table below shows the ratios of the company’s deposits as a percentage of 
the value of planned investment. The first five columns each cover a range of ten 
percent; companies possessing less than one tenth of the expenses of the devel-
opment to be implemented represented 28 percent of all the firms that received 
aid. Adding together the items in the next four columns shows that 64 percent 
of the firms had less than half, while around a fifth of the subsidised firms (15 + 
6 percent) would have been capable of implementing a larger investment pro-
ject than originally planned while applying for the non-repayable funds. It is also 
thought-provoking that almost half of the firms did not even possess internal 
funds amounting to 20–30 percent of the total investment cost.
Table 1
Savings of firms receiving grants, as a percentage of development project cost
0– 
10%
10– 
20%
20– 
30%
30– 
40%
40– 
50%
50–
100%
100–
150% 150% +
As a proportion 
of all firms 28% 14% 9% 7% 6% 15% 6% 15%
Cumulative 
value 28% 42% 51% 58% 64% 79% 85% 100%
Source: own research, palyazat.gov.hu
SMEs grow if they have sufficient internal funds available for development pro-
jects. The market value of companies can only be increased by reliably and pre-
dictably high cash-generating capacity. All ad-hoc or one-off interventions can 
have a positive impact on the firms’ operation and market value. At the time of 
payment of the grants, however, the research question concerns the extent of the 
positive impact that the one-off intervention could have on the firms’ operation. 
Increasing sales revenues is not an aim, but a tool of the development projects; 
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the primary objective is improving profitable operation, which we can identify as 
growth in the value of equity from the profit accumulated over the years.
When an enterprise implements a development project, production tools are 
stated in the books at their true acquisition cost. In the case of development pro-
jects, we would like to show the social value added; but this remains hidden, and 
we can only monitor the impact on economic indicators relating to the whole 
enterprise. As a result of the non-repayable grant, firms’ sales revenue increases 
because during the maintenance period the amount of the grant, which was for-
merly stated as an accrual, can be released and recognised as other revenue. Due 
to this, in comparison with a similar sized competitor implementing a similar-
sized project that has not received a non-repayable grant, the profit will also in-
crease; and this in turn will raise the value of equity through the increase in 
retained earnings. The social value added takes the form of growth in the equity 
of the companies that have received a grant, which materialises in the growth of 
current assets; in other words, it appears as savings, bank deposits, thereby gen-
erating internal funds for the next development project. The grant, therefore, is 
a substantial contribution to the firms’ next development project or investment, 
for which the company will be able to assemble the internal funds more quickly 
due to the increased profitability.
The success of the development policy has to be separated from the success of the 
firm themselves. To be more precise, I propose that the growth in a firm’s general 
profitability should not be regarded as the main characteristic. Let’s take a typi-
cal, ideal enterprise that has received a non-repayable grant and/or discounted 
credit from a development banking system, and/or any credit product from the 
commercial banking sector. Here there are four possible outcomes, depending 
on whether firms made use of one or both of the loans in addition to the grant. 
Specifically, whether it 
•	 received a grant 
•	 received a grant and development credit 
•	 received a grant and a commercial bank loan 
•	 received a grant, development credit and a commercial bank loan.
If we also examine the possibilities in terms of the internal funds available for im-
plementation of the development project, then in one scenario the internal funds 
would be sufficient, but a grant and discounted and/or commercial bank credit 
are used nevertheless; while in the other, the internal funds would not be suffi-
cient, which is why the discounted and/or commercial bank credit are used. This 
makes 10 basic scenarios, which are then supplemented with the additional vari-
able of whether a business partner is involved in the development, thus increas-
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ing the number of possible outcomes to 20. The simplest scenario is that internal 
funds would be sufficient for implementation of the project, but firms accept a 
grant for its implementation. The most complex scenario is where firms’ internal 
funds are not sufficient for implementation of the project, and therefore it makes 
use of a grant, interest-subsidised and market-rate credit, as well as the collabora-
tion of a business partner.
The projects implemented in this way can have a negative or positive impact on 
the cash-generating capacity of the firms as a whole. As a consequence of this, 
the whole enterprise may go from being profitable to being more profitable or less 
profitable, or from loss-making to being profitable, or from loss-making to being 
less loss-making or more loss-making. These five possible outcomes increase the 
number of basic scenarios defined earlier to one hundred. This means that, with 
respect to grants, there is a total of 100 different possible basic scenarios that can 
be compared with each other to a limited extent. If we examine the impact on 
social value added of the use of a grant by a formerly profitable enterprise that 
became less profitable after using the grant, and which possessed sufficient inter-
nal funds for implementation of the development project but still made use of a 
commercial bank loan, then this should be compared with an enterprise imple-
menting a development project of a similar volume and size that did not receive a 
grant, but drew down commercial bank funds despite possessing the full amount 
of liquid assets necessary for the implementation. If there is any divergence in the 
parameters; that is, if we do not compare companies of the same size, then the re-
sult will be distorted. However, we cannot forecast the direction of this, and there 
are no available experiential facts that could help us do this.
The costs and risks of implementing the development project are known to firms 
at the time of planning the project, as are the revenue plans and the costs of opera-
tion; and based on these, it is possible to compile the profit plan for the return on 
the project, and the cash-flow statement, which together can be used to determine 
the return on the development project. The grant, however, is applied for by an 
operational business, and accordingly not only does the project have to yield a 
return, but the whole enterprise has to profit from it, since the logic of the aid 
system is based not on projects, but on subsidised firms.
Firms have to define the cost-cutting benefit of the development project, but at 
the same time it needs to identify the additional costs arising due to the require-
ments of the funding application system, as well as the quantifiable costs of the 
increase in risk. The slowing in the rate of revenue growth due to the require-
ments of the funding application system also has to be determined, although 
it is also possible to assume that this is zero. If all the modifying factors have 
successfully been identified, then it becomes possible to compare the costs and 
revenues of the project implemented under the aid contract with those of the 
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original development project; and the difference between these also reflects the 
bridging costs incurred due to the ex-post financing. In this way, the return on 
the two projects becomes comparable, and thus the difference can also be calcu-
lated. From this, we can deduce the perceived costs of the assets transferred free 
of charge.
In relation to direct state aid, the moral hazard can be defined as follows: An en-
terprise applies for direct state aid although it does not contribute to an increase 
in social value added. The formal modelling of the moral hazard of direct state aid 
grants is addressed by mainstream international research. The analytical model 
set up by Holmstrom–Tirole (1997), regarded as a seminal work for research into 
both state aid grands and SME financing, does not examine direct state aid, but 
investigates the role of the state as a potential source of financial bail-out. Ber-
linger et al. (2016) extend the study to encompass direct state aid and assisted 
loans, but use basic assumptions based on which the moral hazard of state aid 
cannot be investigated in more depth. Owing to the assumption of risk-neutral 
actors, a constant size increase and positive external conditions, the conclusions 
cannot be applied to the problem investigated in my research. 
4 DEFINING INTERNAL FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT
For a high number of firms, we need to determine the indicator that provides the 
value of internal funds necessary for implementing the development projects. At 
the point of making the investment decision, firms need to be aware of their In-
ternal Funds for Development at that moment in time. By this we mean existing 
liquid assets, or those that can be mobilised within a relatively short time, over 
which firms have disposal. In practice, this means cash, bank deposits or money 
invested in securities, and there may also be investment assets which can be sold 
in the given business year, such as real estate, artworks, etc. Here, it is important 
to note that if there is a substantial divergence between the calculated Internal 
Funds for Development and the available liquid assets, then the cause of this di-
vergence might be some operational issue. 
For the purpose of investigating the accounting settlement of the grants and their 
impacts on economic development, we can review the publicly available eco-
nomic data that firms disclose annually as a part of their mandatory reporting. 
When evaluating the business management of a company, profitability is one of 
the most important factors. A direct consequence of the accounting settlement 
of the grants is that the companies receiving grants will grow relative to those 
that have not received them. It is also important, however, to examine how firms 
would manage their resources without the profit-boosting effect of the state aid 
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grant, as this shows how the firms’ income-generating capacity would have devel-
oped ceteris paribus. It is advisable to perform this analysis on a group of firms of 
a similar size, which are active in the same sector and region. 
Submission of the funding application took place during the calendar year, so the 
values may have changed mid-year as a consequence of certain economic events, 
because
•	 payments may already have been made in connection with the funding ap-
plication
•	 there may have been significant movement in the volume of liquid assets, due 
to the change in working capital
•	 dividends may have been paid out
•	 any payment may have been made in connection with another investment 
that is the subject of a funding application
•	 certain financing decisions may have altered the volume of liquid assets
•	 personnel-related withdrawals of cash may have occurred.
In what follows, I will examine the potential distorting effect of the individual 
modifying factors, with a view to selecting the most accurate indicator of internal 
funds for development. While firms are aware of the extent of available internal 
funds at the moment of the investment decision, clearly defining this in retro-
spect can run into difficulties. The possibilities are presented below.
1) Deposits in the year of submitting the application
This indicator shows the cumulative cash flow, in the event that firms retain 
all previously accumulated profit. Domestic SMEs have low capitalisation, so 
if the accumulated liquid assets are serving as a form of capital replacement in 
the course of the firm’s operation, then the value of deposits may be substan-
tially lower than the profit accumulated in previous years. 
2) Deposits in the year prior to submitting the application 
With this, we can estimate the value of available internal funds more accu-
rately if we assume that payments related to implementation of the develop-
ment project were made in the year of submitting the application. In this case, 
the value of deposits at the end of the previous year better expresses the firm’s 
liquidity position, because this is the amount that may have been available 
when the decision to apply for funding was made.
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3) Retained earnings in the year of submitting the application
Expenses may be incurred in the interest of the subsidised project after sub-
mission of the application; but typically, those are due after the decision has 
been made to grant the aid. Consequently, the profit for the given year, and its 
recognition, could still be important when determining the size of the devel-
opment project.
4) Retained earnings in the year prior to submitting the application
If we assume that firms make the decision to launch the development project 
some time in advance, then it could be reasonable to look at the value of re-
tained earnings at an earlier point in time.
We have to decide what type of balance sheet item could be most suitable for esti-
mating the accumulation of an firms’ funds available for development purposes: 
an asset, namely the firms’ more broadly defined liquid assets, or a liability, i.e. 
retained earnings. For the investigation, it is still necessary to consider whether 
we are examining these items in the year of submitting the application or in the 
previous year. We could also propose a composite indicator, which shows what 
share of the firms’ retained earnings is available in the form of liquid assets. This 
could be the ratios of the firms’ deposits, retained earnings and equity to each 
other. However, this indicator would only provide information about the firms’ 
capital structure, and it offers no substance for an investigation of the econom-
ic-stimulus effect of the grants. Finally we can conclude that, for the empirical 
studies, observing the economic data of the companies, the retained earnings in 
the year of submitting the application may be the most precise definition of the 
Internal Funds for Development.
The table below shows the value of retained earnings and volume of deposits 
measured in the year of submitting the application at companies submitting a 
funding application in each individual year. The last column shows the ratio of 
retained earnings to deposits. The year 2007, the first annual period in the seven-
year planning cycle, is not shown in the table because only a few hundred firms 
submitted grant applications in that year.
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Table 2
Selected data of firms submitting grant applications
Retained earnings / 
Project size
Bank Deposits / 
Project size
Retained earnings / 
Bank Deposits
2008 49.249% 25.921% 1.9
2009 86.350% 46.444% 1.9
2010 76.711% 36.941% 2.1
2011 121.662% 75.049% 1.6
2012 56.098% 26.034% 2.2
2013 123.652% 57.816% 2.1
2014 134.968% 41.060% 3.3
2015 81.510% 55.186% 1.5
Source: own research, MNB, KSH
It is clear that in the first three years, the retained earnings of firms that were 
awarded grants are regularly twice the value of their deposits, and this is in line 
with the eight-year average, which shows a figure of 2.1. The years 2011 and 2015 
diverged downwards, while in 2014 the difference more than tripled. In addition 
to 2011 and 2015, the year 2014 was also characterised by retained earnings that 
exceeded the project size on average. While there was relative stability over the 
examined eight years in terms of the ratio of retained earnings to deposits, in 
comparison to the project size the volume of deposits moves within a range of 
25–75 percent without any real trend, and retained earnings were between 49 and 
135 percent. The explanation is that, in each year, different assisted and commer-
cial-bank financing was available to supplement the grants.
And this brings us to the comparability problem: Based on the economic indica-
tors, we observe that the internal funds identified as Internal Funds for Devel-
opment show considerable trendless movement, which signifies the attitude of 
economic actors to the use of non-repayable grants. In the case of non-repayable 
grants we have defined moral hazard as being the risk of firms utilising the aid 
without creating any social value added; but the empirical observation of this 
only becomes possible in the years following the grant payments, when firms pre-
pare their financial statements for the years following payment of the grants, and 
make them available to the Tax Authority and the Controlling Authority manag-
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ing the grants. From this, it is possible to deduce the extent to which firms were 
able to improve their own economic performance with the non-repayable funds, 
and thus create social value added.
5 SUMMARY
Non-repayable state grants are an ex-post funding instrument. This means that 
firms have to possess sufficient funds for full implementation of the funded pro-
ject, which may consist of internal funds, institutional funding sources, bridging 
funds from a business partner, or other tendered funds. It is up to firms to imple-
ment the project, and if it can prove that this has taken place in accordance with 
the terms of funding, then the funds that have been applied for are paid out.
It is important to clarify what really takes place between the state and the subsi-
dised enterprise when a grant is awarded. One question is whether (1) a realloca-
tion of funds takes place; in other words, do firms simply replace their external 
funding requirements with the cheapest available funds, which we refer to as 
crowding out. If (2) a reallocation of income takes place, then besides achieving 
higher profitability, firms receiving the state aid could also see an increase in capi-
tal accumulation. This can boost the competitiveness of the assisted firm, thanks 
to the improvement in their capital structure. If (3) a transfer of assets takes place, 
then the machines, equipment or rights come under the firm’s ownership free of 
charge, thereby increasing the value of the firm. 
The shareholder value of firms can grow in all three scenarios, indirectly due to 
the higher income-generation and better profitability in the first two cases, and 
directly as a consequence of the lower acquisition cost of the production tools in 
the third scenario. The grant constitutes a one-off impact in the life of an enter-
prise, so it is important to investigate what impact it may have on firms’ operation 
during the maintenance period and generally in the years that follow. This data 
will become available in the years ahead.
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